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Extended Abstract
This paper discusses switching regressions econometric modelling with imperfect
regime classication information. The econometric novelty is that misclassication
probabilities are allowed to vary endogenously over time. Standard maximum likeli-
hood estimation is infeasible in this case because each likelihood contribution requires
the evaluation of 2T terms (where T is the number of observations available). We de-
velop an algorithm that allows e¢cient estimation when such imperfect information
is available, by evaluating the exact likelihood through simply T matrix multiplica-
tions (each of a 2  2 matrix times a 2  1 vector.) Our methods are shown to be
widely applicable to various areas of economic analysis such as to Hamiltons work on
Markov-Switching models in Macroeconomics; to external nancing problems faced
by rms in Corporate Finance; and to game-theoretic models of price collusion in
Industrial Organization.
We proceed to apply our methods to analyze price xing by the Joint Executive
Committee railroad cartel from 1880 to 1886 and develop tests of two prototypical
game-theoretic models of tacit collusion. The rst model, due to Abreu, Pearce and
Stacchetti (1986), predicts that price will switch across regimes according to a Markov
process. The second model, by Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), concludes that price
wars are more likely in periods of high industry demand. Switching regressions are
used to model the rms shifting between collusive and punishment behaviour. The
JEC data set is expanded to include measures of grain production to be shipped
and availability of substitute transportation services. Our ndings cast doubt on the
applicability of the Rotemberg and Saloner model to the JEC railroad cartel, while
they conrm the Markovian prediction of the Abreu et al. model.
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price mechanisms, Price-xing
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1 Introduction
This paper discusses switching regressions econometric modelling with imperfect
regime classication information. The econometric novelty is that misclassication
probabilities are allowed to vary endogenously over time. Standard maximum likeli-
hood estimation is infeasible in this case because each likelihood contribution requires
the evaluation of 2T terms (where T is the number of observations available). We de-
velop an algorithm that allows e¢cient estimation when such imperfect information
is available, by evaluating the exact likelihood through simply T matrix multiplica-
tions (each of a 2  2 matrix times a 2  1 vector.) Our methods are shown to be
widely applicable to various areas of analysis such as to Hamiltons work on Markov-
Switching models in Macroeconomics (1996a; 1996b; 1996c; 2001; 2002); to external
nancing problems faced by rms in Corporate Finance (Hajivassiliou and Savignac
(2019)); and to game-theoretic models of price collusion in Industrial Organization.
(See Section 7 below.)
Section 2 analyzes problems of estimation when there are measurement errors in
regime-classication information. In this case, the ML estimator that treats imperfect
classifying information as perfect is inconsistent (Lee and Porter (1984)). Moreover,
ML estimators that do not use regime-classifying information are in general either
seriously ine¢cient (Goldfeld and Quandt (1975)) or not identied. The misclassica-
tion problem is ubiquitous in all econometric applications of the switching-regression
methodology.1 I also examine estimators that incorporate appropriately imperfect
classication information in the form of (multiple) indicator variables. A major dif-
ference between my procedure and the Lee and Porter (1984) analysis is that mine
allows the probabilities of misclassication to vary over the sample period and also
be endogenously determined. These features are expected to be crucial once exoge-
nous classifying information is available, because it is normally harder to accurately
classify a market when it is closer to a transition period.2
Section 3 discusses estimation methods for switching models with imperfect clas-
sication information when switching occurs according to a Markov process. The
problem of classical errors in measuring explanatory variables is also encountered in
our empirical application and is studied in Section 4. The identication of the econo-
metric model with varying misclassication probabilities is established in Section 5.
1Early such applications include Lee and Porter (1984) for an analysis of cartel stability and Lee
(1978) for an analysis of unionization.
2The methodology is in the spirit of the Tobit model of Nelson (1977) with a stochastically
unobservable threshold.
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The indices for industry demand and for extra-cartel competition constructed for this
paper may contain serious measurement errors; hence, it is important that estimation
methods allow for this possibility.3 In Section 6 we derive a recursion relation that
makes tractable the evaluation of the likelihood functions of our general econometric
models.
We proceed in Section 7 to apply our methods to analyze price xing by the Joint
Executive Committee railroad cartel from 1880 to 1886 and develop tests of two pro-
totypical game-theoretic models of tacit collusion. The rst model, due to Abreu,
Pearce and Stacchetti (1986), predicts that price will switch across regimes according
to a Markov process. The second model, by Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), con-
cludes that price wars are more likely in periods of high industry demand. Switching
regressions are used to model the rms shifting between collusive and punishment
behaviour. The JEC data set is expanded to include measures of grain production to
be shipped and availability of substitute transportation services. The ndings cast
doubt on the applicability of the Rotemberg and Saloner model to the JEC railroad
cartel, while they conrm the Markovian prediction of the Abreu et al. model.
Section 8 concludes.
2 Imperfect Classication Information in Switching Re-
gressions
The econometric methods we present in this Section have wide applicability in vari-
ous areas of economic analysis. Examples are: Hamiltons work on Markov-Switching
models in Macroeconomics (1996a; 1996b; 1996c; 2001; 2002); external nancing
problems faced by rms in Corporate Finance (Hajivassiliou and Savignac (2019));
and game-theoretic models of price collusion in Industrial Organization (see Sec-
tion ?? below).
2.1 A Single Regime Indicator
Consider the general switching-regression model:
yi t = hi(Xii) + it i = 0; 1; t = 1; :::; T (2:1:a)
y2t = h2(Zt) + 2t (2:1:b)
3We show in that Section how simulation estimation methods (McFadden (1989), Pakes and
Pollard (1989)) can handle the concomitant high-dimensional integrals that arise in nonlinear errors-
in-variables models such as the switching-regression models of this paper.
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y3t = y

2t + t: (2:1:c)
Here, y0t, y

1t, y

2t, and y

3t are latent variables, unobservable by the econometri-
cian; X0, X1, X2, and Z are matrices of explanatory (exogenous) variables; and
(0t; 1t; 2t; t)
0 is multivariate normally distributed, i:i:d: over time, with zero-mean.
The functions hi(), i = 0; 1; 2, are known to the econometrician up to the vectors of
parameters i and , which will be estimated.
The econometrician observes the (endogenous) variable Yt, which is generated as
follows:
Yt =
y1t i¤ y

2t = 0
y0t otherwise
(2:2)
In standard terminology, the two equations (2.1.a), i = 0; 1, are termed the switched"
equations and (2:1:b) the switching" equation. Using the indicator function intro-
duced above, we dene the dummy variables It  1 (y

2t  0) and Dt  1 (y

3t  0).
The econometrician observes Dt but not It. As long as 
2
 > 0, Dt is an imperfect
measurement of It. In this sense, t can be thought of as coding error.
In its general form without measurement errors in regime classication, the switching-
regression model was used by Lee (1978) to study union/nonunion wage determina-
tion.4 As Lee and Porter (1984) explain, using inaccurate regime classication in-
formation in ML estimation leads to inconsistency. Moreover, Goldfeld and Quandt
(1975) show that if perfect information is not used, ML estimation is seriously ine¢-
cient. Hajivassiliou (1987) combines these results to derive Hausman (1978) tests of
accuracy of classication information.
Lee and Porter (1984) allowed for a constant probability that observations were
misclassied into the two regimes; their only explanatory variable in the switching
equation, Z, was a constant. But assuming a constant probability of misclassication
is inappropriate if one expects the probability of misclassication to vary over time,
and especially so if one has exogenous information represented by Zt, which, as theory
suggests, should a¤ect switching.
I model the misclassication probability as a monotonic function of the (unob-
servable) propensity of the industry to be in a particular regime measured by the
latent variable y2t. For example, in the disequilibrium version of the switching model
(Fair and Ja¤ee (1972), it seems plausible to assume that the probability of misclassi-
cation is smaller the larger the level of excess demand in the system. I demonstrate
shortly that the coding error equation (2:1:c) incorporates this property into the
4Fair and Ja¤ee (1972), inter alia, used the model to analyze markets in disequilibrium, by letting
y1t denote notional demand in period t, y

0t notional supply, and y

2t excess demand.
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model.
The contribution of an (independent) observation t to the likelihood function of
the switching-regression model with coding error can be derived as follows: First
observe that
for Dt = 1 : y

3t = 0 if y

2t = 0; t =  y

2t Yt = y

1t (It = 1)
if y2t < 0; t =  y

2t Yt = y

0t (It = 0)
for Dt = 0 : y

3t < 0 if y

2t < 0; t <  y

2t Yt = y

0t (It = 0)
if y2t = 0; t <  y

2t Yt = y

1t (It = 1)
(2:3)
Let us use the notation pdjit  prob(Dt = djIt = i), pdit  prob(Dt = d; It = i),
pdt = prob(Dt = d), it = prob(It = i), and fit = pdf(y

i t), where d and i take
values 0 or 1. For simplicity assume that 0t and 1t are independent of 2t and
t.
5 Dropping the t subscript for simplicity, this specication implies that the log-
likelihood contribution is:
prob(D; yjX) = D  ln(p1j1f1 + p1j0f0) + (1 D)  ln(p0j1f1 + p0j0f0): (2:4)
Note that the pdjis involve bivariate integrals of the form
pdji =
Z Z
SDI
f(2; )d2d =
Z
SI
f(2)d2; (2:5)
where   2   , and the regions of integration (as described in (2.3)) are the sets:
SDI = f2
>
<
I
  Z; 
>
<
D
  (Z + 2)g and SI = f2
>
<
I
  Zg,
where
>
<
I
 f if I = 1; < if I = 0g and
>
<
D
 f if D = 1; < if D = 0g:
The common distributional assumption of normality is imposed.
The coding error model with the likelihood function dened by using (2.3)(2.5)
possesses the desired property that the misclassication probability is highest at the
borderline case when a regime switch appears most likely, and falls monotonically as
the exogenous classifying information becomes stronger. To see this, rst note that
the probabilities of misclassication are:
(D = 1jI = 0) : p1j0 = prob(t =  y

2tjy

2t < 0)
(D = 0jI = 1) : p0j1 = prob(t <  y

2tjy

2t = 0)
(2:6)
Figure 1 presents probability plots for the misclassication case of D = 1 and I =
5This assumption can be relaxed at the cost of further computational complexity.
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0 as a function of the exogenous part of the switching equation, Z.6 Various values
of the standard deviation of the coding error  are considered. As can be seen from
Figure 1a, the conditional probability of misclassication, p1j0, is monotonic in Z in
the desired direction, rising when the signal Z tends to suggest the wrong regime
more strongly. For example, when the true state of the system is no collusion (I = 0),
higher values of Z are further at odds with the truth, hence Prob(D = 1jI = 0)
rises. As the standard deviation of the coding error  rises, the signal becomes less
informative; in the limit, when  !1, the misclassication probabilities (Prob(D =
djI = i); d 6= i; ) approach 0.5 . Hence, we conrm that the switching model with
coding error introduced here possesses the desired property that the misclassication
probability falls as the tendency to lie in a particular regime rises. In Figure 1b we
see that the joint probability of misclassication p10 has a unique mode at the least
informative value of the signal, Z = 0, since in such a case it is most di¢cult to
correctly classify the particular period.
*** FIGURES 1a, 1b, 1c about HERE ***
An important caveat is that the coding-error switching-regression model allows
only a limited degree of systematic misclassication. For example, despite the pres-
ence of the coding errors, the only change in the discrete part of the model, (2:1:b),
is in the variance of the latent variable y2t, which is, of course, unidentied. This
is illustrated in Figure 1c. Hence, one can obtain consistent estimates for  up to
scale despite such misclassication.7 This, however, does not imply that the pres-
ence of the coding error is unimportant, because ML estimation of the complete
discrete/continuous switching-regression model would still yield inconsistent results
if the measurement errors were neglected.
2.2 Multiple Regime Indicators
Finally, suppose we have M multiple indicators D1; :::; DM of regime classication.
This is the nonlinear analogue of the classic MIMIC model of Goldberger (1972). We
then obtain 2M+1 categories with respect to D1; :::; DM , and I.
8
The likelihood contributions will in general involve (M +1)fold integrals, which
can be calculated by numerical methods for M up to 2 or 3. This modelling ap-
proach, like the coding-error model with a single indicator, (2.1)(2.2), also has the
6The corresponding plots for the case with D = 0 and I = 1 are exact mirror images with respect
to Z = 0 of those in Figure 1 and are not given separately.
7The importance of this restrictive feature of my measurement errors model will be investigated
in future work.
8For the purposes of the empirical implementation in Section 7.4 with two imperfect classication
indicators, I dene R  Z and give the eight possibilities in that case:
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desirable property that the misclassication probabilities vary over the sample period
depending on the true probability of switching.9
3 A Markovian Switching Model with Imperfect Classi-
cation
Because of the i:i:d: assumptions on the error vector (0t; 1t; 2t; t)
0, the models
of the previous section exhibit a Bernoulli switching structure, conditional on the
exogenous variables. This is characterized by a transition matrix:
: It = 1 It = 0
It 1 = 1  t 1   t Bernoulli
It 1 = 0  t 1   t
(3:1)
In (3.1) the transition probabilities  s depend on time only through the exogenous
variables, but not on the past state variable. Next I introduce a model that allows
the switching process to exhibit Markov dependence over time. This is necessary to
test the key prediction of Markovian switching of the game-theoretic model of Abreu
et al. (1986).
If It is a Markov process, then it has the transition structure:
: It = 1 It = 0
It 1 = 1 11t 1  11t Markov
It 1 = 0 01t 1  01t
(3:2)
where  ijt = Prob(It = ijIt 1 = j).
10 Specically, to introduce a Markov structure
D1 D2 I 2   1 2   2 2
1 1 1 2   1 > 0 2   2 > 0 2 5 R
1 1 0 2   1 > 0 2   2 > 0 2 > R
1 0 1 2   1 > 0 2   2 5 0 2 5 R
1 0 0 2   1 > 0 2   2 5 0 2 > R
0 1 1 2   1 5 2   2 > 0 2 5 R
0 1 0 2   1 5 2   2 > 0 2 > R
0 0 1 2   1 5 2   2 5 0 2 5 R
0 0 0 2   1 5 2   2 5 0 2 > R
9Under the normality assumptions discussed above, in the empirical implementations below the
bivariate integrals are calculated through an algorithm of Divgi (1979). In the case of two indica-
tor variables in Section 7.4, the implied trivariate integrals are calculated through the method in
Steck (1958). The higher dimension integrals implied by more indicators can be accommodated by
simulation estimation methods. See Hajivassiliou (1993) for a discussion.
10One expects positive serial persistence, in the sense of 11t > 10t.
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of order 1, I modify the switching equation (2.1.b) so that the propensity to switch,
y2t, depends on the lagged state It 1, i.e.,
It =
(
1 if Zt + It 1 + 2t = 0
0 otherwise:
(3:3)
With perfect classication information, this structure is straightforward to estimate
since11
p[Y; I; I0jX]  p[Y1;    ; YT ; I1;    ; IT ; I0jX1;    ; XT ]
= p[YT ; IT jIT 1; XT ]p[YT 1; IT 1jIT 2; XT 1]    p[Y2; I2jI1; X2]p[Y1; I1jI0; X1]p[I0]:
(3:4)
The likelihood function for process (3.2)(3.3), however, becomes extremely intractable
in the presence of imperfect regime-classication information because it then requires
the evaluation of 2T terms. The reason is as follows. We can readily show that
p[Dt; ItjIt 1] =
Itp[Dt; It = 1jIt 1] + (1  It)p[Dt; It = 0jIt 1] (3:5:a)
p[Yt; DtjIt 1] =
Dt[f1Itp[1; 1jIt 1]+f0(1 It)p[1; 0jIt 1]]+(1 Dt)[f1Itp[0; 1jIt 1]+f0(1 It)p[0; 0jIt 1]];
(3:5:b)
where It is determined by (3.3). But the econometrician only observes Dt, given by
Dt =
(
1 if Zt + It 1 + 2t + t = 0
0 otherwise:
(3:6)
Since It 1 is unobserved by the econometrician for all t, the likelihood function is
p[Y;DjX] =
X
IT
X
IT 1
  
X
I2
X
I1
X
I0
p[YT ; Dt; IT jIT 1]    p[Y1; d1; I1jI0]  p[I0]: (3:7)
Because each pair of consecutive terms involves It 1 , the likelihood p[Y;DjX] will
in general require the evaluation of 2T terms, a patently intractable task when T is
of the order of 300, as in this paper. To solve this problem I show in Section 6 that,
by extending ideas in Cosslett and Lee (1985) and Moran (1986), a recursion relation
can be derived that makes evaluation of (3.7) feasible.
11Note that it is not crucial how one treats p[I0], since this term has asymptotically vanishing
inuence. This is in contrast to the longitudinal data set case.
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Note again that the approach here di¤ers fundamentally from that of Lee and
Porter (1984) and Cosslett and Lee (1985) in that the probability of misclassication
is not constant but varies monotonically with the magnitude of Zt + It 1 . A
priori, this is a realistic feature. Given the dependence over time described in (3.2),
one should expect the probability of misclassication to vary over time; it should
be highest close to the boundary points when a switch occurs. These properties are
exhibited by the conditional probability expressions above.12
4 Classical Measurement Errors
At least two explanatory variables that I shall use to test the game-theoretic models
are measured with potentially serious errors. The variables most suspect are the
constructed index of grain production to be shipped and the constructed measure
of the availability and strength of extra-cartel competition. Hence, in this section I
investigate the e¤ect of measurement errors in the explanatory variables of nonlinear
models of the type estimated here. I will show that structural ML estimation of
such models introduces high-dimensional integration problems, which can be avoided
by employing simulation estimation methods (McFadden (1989), Pakes and Pollard
(1989)).
To see how multiple integrals arise in models we analyze in this paper, consider
the general limited dependent variable (LDV) model
yt = z

t + t; (4:1)
where the econometrician observes yt = (y

t ). The function () maps the vector of
underlying latent variables, yt , into the vector of observable endogenous variables, yt.
For example, in the switching-regression model of Section 2, yt = (y

0t; y

1t; y

2t; y

3t)
0,
yt = (Yt; Dt), and the () function is specied implicitly in equation (2.3). In (4.1),
zt is a k  1 vector of explanatory variables that are not directly observed. Instead
we have the imperfect measurement xt, given by
xt = z

t  + vt: (4:2)
In terms of the observable limited dependent variable yt, the model (4.1) can be
12There is a cost, however, in terms of computational complexity because the conditional proba-
bility expressions p[Dt; ItjIt 1] now involve bivariate normal integrals (and in general (M + 1)fold
integrals when M imperfect regime indicator variables are available).
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written as:
yt = (z

t + t): (4:3)
Assuming that the measurement errors are of the classical form, it is plausible to
postulate that f(yjz; x) = f(yjz), which follows from mean-independence of the
measurement error vt and the true variables z

t .
13 Hence, using basic properties
of conditional probability functions, the likelihood contribution conditional on the
observable vector x is
f(yjx) =
Z
f(y; zjx)dz =
Z
f(y; z; x)=f(x)dz =
Z
f(yjz; x)  f(zjx)dz =
Z
f(yjz)  f(zjx)dz: (4:4)
Equation (4.4) illustrates that integration of order equal to the number of x
variables will be needed to evaluate the likelihood in terms of the observable variables
y and x. This is in addition to any integration required to calculate the density of
y conditional on the unobservable z variables. These di¢culties arise because the
mismeasured regressors appear inside the nonlinear function (). For example, in
the switching-regression models of the previous sections, one must rst calculate the
likelihood assuming all explanatory variables are observed without error, f(yjz).
Then double numerical quadrature is required to evaluate f(yjx), given that two of
the zs are observed imperfectly.14 In the estimation section below, I o¤er both
quadrature-based ML estimates with two mismeasured explanatory variables, as well
as estimates by simulation estimation methods. This allows a comparative evaluation
of the latter.15
13An alternative way of introducing measurement errors in the explanatory variables is through
mixture models. This approach simultaneously estimates non-parametrically the (x; z) relation.
Given the relatively small sample size for my complicated nonlinear model, I chose instead to pa-
rameterize explicitly the measurement errors to be of the classical type. For a general review of
measurement error models, see Fuller (1987).
14A second di¢culty that arises in nonlinear models with classical measurement errors in RHS
variables is that the covariance matrix of the f(yjz; x) distribution is a general k k matrix , even
when t has a scalar covariance matrix. This problem is explained in the Online Extended version
of this paper.
15The method employed here is Maximum Simulated Likelihood (MSL) based on the Smooth
Recursive Conditioning simulator (SRC) of Börsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou (1993). For a more
detailed discussion of this method as well as of other simulation estimation methods for limited
dependent variable models that are continuous in the parameter vector, see Hajivassiliou (1994) and
Hajivassiliou and McFadden (1998).
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5 Identication of SwitchingModel with Imperfect Regime
Classication
In this Section I show how all the parameters of the switching-regression model with
coding error (2.1.a)(2.1.c) are econometrically identied, subject to the normaliza-
tion that 2 = 1. Recall the denitions
pdi  Prob(D = d; I = i) (5:1:a)
pdji  Prob(D = djI = i) (5:1:b)
pd  Prob(D = d) (5:1:c)
i  Prob(I = i): (5:1:d)
Under the normality assumptions imposed and the normalization 2 = 1
pd = D  Prob(D = 1) + (1 D)  Prob(D = 0) =
D  (Z=
q
1 + 2) + (1 D)  (1  (Z=
q
1 + 2)) (5:2)
i = I Prob(I = 1)+ (1  I) Prob(I = 0) = I (Z)+ (1  I)  (1 (Z)) (5:3)
Using only the imperfect classication indicator D, from the marginal likelihood (5.2)
we can estimate the expression =
q
1 + 2 consistently.
Now consider the marginal likelihood for the observed endogenous variable y,
neglecting any classication information, i.e., consider the marginal likelihood
f(y) = f1  1 + f0  0 = f1  (Z) + f0  (1  (Z)): (5:4)
From this, we can obtain consistent estimates for the parameters 1, 0, 1, 0, and ,
provided either the functions h0() and h1() are not the same, or further restrictions
on 1 and 0 are imposed.
Finally, consider the conditional likelihood
f(yjD = 1) = f1 
p11
p1
+ f0 
p10
p1
; (5:5)
which uses separately the observations classied by the (imperfect) indicator D to
be in collusion. We see immediately that in such a case the expressions p11=p1 and
11
p10=p1 are consistently estimable. But
p11=p1 = p1j1  1=p1 = p1j1  (Z)=(Z=
q
1 + 2); (5:6)
hence, p1j1 can also be identied. The identication of the remaining term p0j0 follows
from exactly analogous arguments.
6 A Recursion Algorithm for the Markovian Switching-
Regression Model with Coding Error
The aim is to facilitate evaluation of the likelihood function of Section 3, which is
given by:
p[y;DjX] =
X
IT
X
IT 1
  
X
I2
X
I1
X
I0
p[yT ; Dt; IT jIT 1]    p[y1; d1; I1jI0]:p[I0]: (6:1)
The di¢culty in evaluating (6.1) directly is that each pair of consecutive terms in-
volves It 1; hence, each likelihood evaluation will require calculating 2
T terms, which
is a computationally prohibitive task.
The following arguments generalize ideas in Cosslett and Lee (1985) and Moran
(1986) and show how (6.1) can be evaluated recursively through T matrix multi-
plications. Dene the set of available endogenous information at time t by St, i.e.,
St  (y1; D1; y2; D2; :::; yt; Dt). Further dene Qt(It)  p[St; It]. Since we can always
write
Qt(It) = p[St 1; yt; Dt; It] =
X
It 1
p[St 1; It 1; yt; Dt; It]; (6:2)
it follows that
Qt(It) =
X
It 1
p[yt; Dt; ItjIt 1; St 1]:p[It 1; St 1] =
X
It 1
p[yt; Dt; ItjIt 1] Qt 1(It 1);
(6:3)
where we have used the Markov structure p[yt; Dt; ItjIt 1; St 1] = p[yt; Dt; ItjIt 1]
and the denition Qt 1(It 1)  p[It 1; St 1]. But calculation of (6.3) only requires
information up to t, as the following matrix equation shows: 
QT (0)
QT (1)
!
=
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p[yt; Dt; It = 0jIt 1 = 0] p[yt; Dt; It = 0jIt 1 = 1]
p[yt; Dt; It = 1jIt 1 = 0] p[yt; Dt; It = 1jIt 1 = 1]
!

 
QT 1(0)
QT 1(1)
!
(6:4)
or,
Qt =Mt Qt 1:
The likelihood (6.1) can thus be calculated recursively from (6.4) and
p[y;DjX] =
X
IT
QT (IT ) = QT (0) +QT (1): (6:1
0)
7 Empirical Application: Testing Prototypical Models
of Price Fixing
We now use the methods developed above to test two prototypical game-theoretic
models of cartel behaviour. The rst model, due to Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti
(1986), predicts that behaviour switches across collusive/price-warfare regimes ac-
cording to a Markov process. The second model, due to Rotemberg and Saloner
(1986), predicts that the probability of a price war is higher in periods of high in-
dustry demand. Maximum likelihood (ML) and simulation estimation methods that
allow for measurement errors in switching-regression models are presented and applied
to test these models using data on the Joint Executive Committee (JEC) railroad
cartel for the period 1880-1886.
Subsection 7.1 discusses the Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1986) model [APS]
and the Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) model [RS]. It should be noted that the rst
game-theoretic model of tacit collusion to predict switching behaviour across collusive
and price-warfare regimes was the model of Green and Porter (1984), which has
already been tested elsewhere. (See Lee and Porter (1984) and Porter (1983b)). We
then present a simple model of a symmetric oligopoly which nests the basic predictions
of APS and RS. This second prediction seems counter to the conventional view of
the classical industrial organization literature (see for example Stigler (1964)). The
econometric framework developed in subsection 7.2 allows one to employ imperfect
regime-classication information, which is available from several sources. The use of
regime-classication information is a novel feature of the paper that distinguishes it
from Berry and Briggs (1988), who tested the Markovian prediction of the Abreu et
al. model, but did not exploit such information.
The JEC data used in this study are discussed in subsection 7.3. The data set,
originally developed by Porter (1983b) and Lee and Porter (1984), is expanded to
include measures of grain production to be shipped and the availability of substitute
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transportation services. The construction of these measures is described in Data
Appendix.
Section 7.4 presents the empirical implementation. We nd that the predictions
of the RS model are not borne out by this data set. The evidence favours instead the
Markovian prediction of the APS theory.
7.1 Prototypical Game-Theoretic Models of Price Fixing Behaviour
Lee and Porter (1984) and Porter (1983b) used switching-regression methodology to
test the game-theoretic models of Porter (1983a) and Green and Porter (1984). In
this paper I consider two other models of price xing, one by Rotemberg and Saloner
(1986) and the second by Abreu et al. (1986).
I rst summarize the Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) model.16 Consider a sym-
metric n-rm, price-setting cartel facing stochastic demand. At each period the level
of demand is a random variable independently and identically distributed (i:i:d:) over
time. The rms learn the realized state of demand before making (simultaneously)
their price choices. When demand is high, each rm feels a temptation to undercut
its competitors in order to take advantage of high demand now, because it does not
expect it to persist. The i:i:d: assumption leads rms to expect that demand will be
lower next period. Hence, a punishment by the competitors would appear less severe
than if rms believed it likely that high demand would persist in the next period.
As a result, Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) predict that in the presence of observable
demand shocks, price wars (in the sense of less collusion) will occur mostly during
industry booms.17 This prediction is contrary to the conventional wisdom of the
traditional industrial organization literature, which holds that it is generally more
di¢cult to collude successfully during industry recessions when each rm is possibly
preoccupied with its own survival. Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), pp.395-396, de-
scribe how modication of their basic model yields behaviour that uctuates between
periods of cooperation and non-cooperation. This arises when the strategy space
is restricted so that the oligopoly can choose only between the joint monopoly and
the competitive prices. They believe this version of their model is intuitively more
appealing, and they show that the basic prediction that price wars are more likely
to occur in demand booms is preserved.
The alternative game-theoretic model of collusion I shall test is due to Abreu et al.
16For an excellent review of game-theoretic models of tacit collusion see Chapter 6 in Tirole (1988).
17These are not necessarily price wars in the usual sense of periods of maximal punishment of
Bertrand (competitive) behaviour, because the price may actually be higher during booms than
during recessions.
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(1986). In this model, rms do not observe their competitors quantities but rather
the market price whose distribution is determined by industry output and realized
demand. Demand shocks are i:i:d: over time but are not observed by the rms. In this
supergame, the rms have concave objective functions, and the distribution of the
market price pt conditional on aggregate output Qt is assumed to have the property
that a low price is more likely to have arisen from a high Qt than from a low one.
Abreu et al. (1986) are able to show that under these assumptions price wars will
result; the behaviour of rms will be characterized by a trigger scheme, usually a
tail test." During periods of successful collusion, each rm will be producing q+ and
earning payo¤ V +. A trigger-price level p+ will be determined such that observation
of a price lower than p+ will trigger a punishment phase in which rms will each
produce a (higher) output q  and earn a lower payo¤ V  . This provides incentives
for rms to restrict output. A second trigger p  will determine whether a punishment
phase will persist or whether the industry will revert to successful collusion. Since a
harsh punishment requires a high output, reversion to successful collusion will involve
an inverse tail test": if a high price (greater than p ) is observed, the game remains
in the punishment phase. Conversely, successful collusion resumes when a price lower
than the p  threshold is observed; again, this provides incentives for high output.
*** FIGURE 2 about HERE ***
Figure 2 shows two examples of the distribution of price given total output
f(ptjQt), one when aggregate output is collusive (Q
+) and one when the industry
is producing high output (Q ); the trigger prices p+ and p  also appear in the g-
ure. Dene the successful collusion indicator It such that It = 1 indicates collusive
output is produced in period t and It = 0 indicates that this is a punishment period.
The Abreu et al. model predicts that industry behaviour switches between periods of
successful collusion and punishment phases (of endogenous duration) according to a
Markov process. If period t  1 was one of successful collusion, then with probability
B = Prob(pt < p
+jIt 1 = 1) a punishment phase will begin in period t. On the other
hand, if a punishment phase began in period t  1 (It 1 = 0), the cartel will continue
its high output/low price punishment with probability C = Prob(pt  p
 jIt 1 = 0)
and will resume successful collusion with probability D = Prob(pt < p
 jIt 1 = 0).
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If the industry has been in the punishment state for more than one period, these
18One of the key additional conditions required for the trigger scheme to have the a simple tail
test" described here is the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP), dened as
@
@pt

@f=@Q
f
t

< 0;
where f  f(ptjQt) .
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probabilities will be Prob(pt  p
 jpt 1  p
 ) and Prob(pt < p
 jpt 1  p
 ) respec-
tively.19 For a variant of a model with similar qualitative implications, consider the
price-secrecy model of Tirole (1988), section 6.7, which predicts price wars as trig-
gered by recessions. In Tiroles model, the rms produce a di¤erentiated product but
do not observe their competitors prices; instead, they try to infer these prices from
their own demand. This assumption is in line with Stigler (1964). This model also
predicts that the industry switches between collusion and punishment (in this case
Bertrand) phases. Hence, in this theory, price wars can be involuntary, in that they
may be triggered by an unobservable negative demand shock and not necessarily be
attributable to secret undercutting by a cartel member.
7.2 Econometric Testing Framework Adapted to Models of Collu-
sion
For econometric purposes, the following simple model of a symmetric oligopoly nests
in a simple way the Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) and the Abreu et al. (1986)
game-theoretic models of price xing outlined in the previous subsection. Suppose
that an n-rm price-setting cartel switches between collusive and punishment (or
non-collusive) behaviour, according to the collusion indicator function
It = Rt(
t); (7:2:1)
where 
t is the relevant information set available to the rms at time t, and It takes
the value 0 if punishment (or non-collusive) behaviour occurs in period t, and the
value 1 if collusion occurs then.
Further suppose that the industry is characterized by a marginal cost function
MCt = MC(zt; ct) and a demand function qt = q(pt; xt; dt), where zt and xt are
vectors of exogenous variables, and ct and dt are random shocks. Whether or
not the realizations of c and d are observed by the rms at the time of the de-
cision depends on the model under analysis; they are always unobservable by the
econometrician. The functions f() and q() and the exogenous variables are known
to the rms. In competitive periods price equals marginal cost, while in collu-
sive periods marginal revenue equals marginal cost. Hence, in the latter periods,
19Pursuing the implications of this theory further, a positive shift in the distribution of demand due
to some exogenous factor would increase the persistence in the Markov process: Imagine a rightward
shift of the f(ptjQt) family of distributions, which the rms do not perceive and hence continue
employing the same p+, p  thresholds. It is straightforward to see that both A = Prob(It = 1jIt 1 =
1)  Prob(pt  p
+jpt 1  p
+) and C = Prob(It = 0jIt 1 = 0)  Prob(pt  p
 jpt < p
+) will rise
under such a scenario.
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pt = MC(zt; ct)   qt(pt; xt; dt)=q
0
t(pt; xt; dt), where q
0
t(pt; xt; dt) 
@
@pt
qt(pt; xt; dt).
Let 1(A) be the indicator function, taking the value 1 if logical condition A is true,
0 otherwise. In this notation, It  1(collusion is e¤ective in period t). The evolution
of pt can thus be summarized by
pt =MC(zt; ct)  It  q(pt; xt; dt)=q
0(pt; xt; dt): (7:2:2)
For the econometric implementations I assume the following parameterization of
the demand function:20
qt = ae
 pt=g(xt;dt): (7:2:3)
This functional form is chosen so that price will be independent of xt in competitive
periods but will vary positively with g(xt) in collusive ones, since qt=q
0
t =  g(xt; dt) .
For tractability, assume further that g(xt; dt) = exp(xt)+dt andMCt =MC(zt)+
ct . I also assume that c and d are independent of one another, independent over
time, and independent of xt and zt. The price and (log) quantity equations for
observation t in the two regimes can then be shown to be:
Non-Collusive Behaviour:
It = 0
pt =MC(zt) + p0t
ln qt = ln a MC(zt)= exp(xt) + q0t
(7:2:4a)
Collusive Behaviour:
It = 1
pt =MC(zt) + exp(xt) + p1t
ln qt = ln a  (1 +MC(zt))= exp(xt) + q1t
(7:2:4b)
The two sets of price and quantity equation errors, p0, q0, p1, and q1, are nonlinear
functions of the demand and supply errors d and c, and have the property that
E(p0jX;Z) = E(p1jX;Z) = E(q0jX;Z) = E(q1jX;Z) = 0.
21
The game-theoretic models under study di¤er primarily in their implications
20See Roth (1988) for a variant of this model that also allows parametrically di¤erent degrees of
collusion. The model presented here possesses the property that expected output under collusion is
1=e times the competitive one.
21Equations (7.2.4a) and (7.2.4b) assume implicitly that
E

f(z) + c
exp(x) + d
 z; x  f(z)
exp(x)
+ q:
Under these conditions, the main requirement for consistency of the ML procedures is satised. This
specication also implies a specic contemporaneous covariance structure between p0, p1, q0; and
q1 in (7.2.4), since, for example, p0  c + d and p1  c. In this paper I neglect the particular
form of this covariance structure; ignoring it a¤ects only the e¢ciency of the estimation procedures.
17
about the collusion indicator function (7.2.1). Let Wt denote the subset of 
t ob-
served by the econometrician, i.e., the set of all relevant exogenous variables in the
model. Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) predict that the extent of collusion in some
variants of their model, or the probability of a switch into a collusive regime in oth-
ers, falls as the level of industry demand increases. A simple parameterization of this
prediction is
It =
(
1 if Wt + ut = 0
0 otherwise
(7:2:5:a)
Here Wt includes the demand variables xt in the model, and each element of  cor-
responding to one of these variables has the opposite sign that the coe¢cient of that
variable has in the demand function (jj < 0). For example, a variable with a
positive demand e¤ect ( > 0) should have a negative e¤ect on the probability of
successful collusion ( < 0). The error ut is i.i.d. and (weakly) exogenous with
respect to Wt, i.e., EfutjWtg = 0.
On the other hand, the key prediction of Abreu et al. (1986) is that switching
between regimes will evolve according to a Markov process. This theory can be
parameterized by
It =
(
1 if Wt + It 1 + ut = 0
0 otherwise
(7:2:5:b)
again with ut i.i.d. and EfutjWt = 0g. The Abreu et al. prediction is that the
coe¢cient of  should be positive and statistically signicant.
7.3 The JEC Data
The data analyzed in this study are 328 weekly observations, from week 1, 1880 to
week 16, 1886, of the operation of the Joint Executive Committee (JEC) railroad
cartel. As documented by Ulen (1979), the cartel, which primarily shipped grain
from Chicago to the East Coast, had extremely varied success in setting price and
sharing the market. The e¤ective price charged by each cartel member was not per-
fectly observable by its rivals because special shipping rates were sometimes secretly
arranged with selected customers. The o¢cial price of shipping grain, labeled as
series ShipRate, is plotted in Figure 3. According to MacAvoy (1965), there were
two critical periods of non-adherence to the o¢cial price: most of 1881 and most
of 1884-1885. For detailed historical discussions of the events, see MacAvoy (1965),
Ulen (1979), and Roth (1988).
*** FIGURE 3 about HERE ***
The only exogenous information used in the Porter (1983b) and Lee and Porter
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(1984) studies was whether or not the lakes were open for navigation. This infor-
mation is important because lake tra¢c was the leading substitute for shipping by
railway. The dummy variable providing this information is also plotted in Figure 3
as series LakesOpen.
Other important exogenous determinants were left out, however. To remedy
this, I compiled and used two additional pieces of exogenous information: an index of
extra-cartel railroad competition and an index of total grain produced in the Midwest
that might be shipped to the East Coast. For details on the construction of these
indices, see Data Appendix. The index of extra-cartel competition, which is plotted
in Figure 4a, is based on the simple assumption that the strength of such competition
was positively related to the number of railroads that were shipping grain to the East
Coast but were operating outside the cartel. The index of total grain production in
the Midwest is a value-weighted annual total of the three largest grain crops produced
in eight midwestern states, linearly interpolated to obtain weekly values for the index.
The total Midwestern grain production index appears in Figure 4b.
***FIGURES 4a and 4b about HERE ***
Various other sources of information about regime classication are available.
Ulen (1983) and MacAvoy (1965) constructed such indicators by relying on percep-
tions of the e¤ectiveness of the JEC cartel as reported in contemporaneous weekly
trade periodicals. A second index of cartel adherence was compiled by Ulen (1979).
Porter (1983b) constructed a third index based on the predictions from his econo-
metric model, according to the criterion of maximum estimated probability.22 These
regime-classication indicators are incorporated in the econometric implementation
of the tests in Section 7.4, using the multiple dummy indicator models developed
above.23
Lack of good technological variables forces me to adopt the further simplifying
assumption that, apart from stochastic shocks, marginal cost is constant, or MCt =
0 + ct . This implies we have only demand variables to treat as exogenous, i.e.,
Wt = xt.
24 Four such exogenous variables comprise xt: a vector of ones, the dummy
variable indicating whether or not the lakes were open, the index of extra-cartel
railway competition, and the index of grain available to be shipped. Ceteris paribus,
one expects higher demand for the shipping services of the cartel in periods when the
22Consider an event with J exhaustive outcomes indexed by j = 1;    ; J , outcome j occurring
with probability pj ,
P
j
pj = 1. Denote the predicted probabilities estimated by some model by p^j .
Then the criterion of maximum estimated probability corresponds to predicting outcome l will occur
if p^l = maxj(p^1;    ; p^J).
23These three indices are plotted in Figure 5 of the Online extended version of this paper.
24A simple alternative I plan to explore is that there are seasonal e¤ects in the marginal cost
function.
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lakes were closed to navigation, when competition from railways outside the cartel
was not vigorous, and when there was a big grain crop in the Midwest.
7.4 Empirical Implementation
7.4.1 Estimation Models
To summarize, I use the econometric framework of the switching model of cartel
behaviour, presented in Section 2, to test the two game-theoretic models under the
additional assumption that marginal cost does not depend on any exogenous infor-
mation and is constant apart from a random error, i.e., MC = 0 + ct:
Non-Collusive Behaviour:
It = 0
(
pt = 0 + p0t
ln(qt) = ln(a)  0= exp(xt) + q0t
)
(7:1:0)
Collusive Behaviour:
It = 1
(
pt = 0 + exp(xt) + p1t
ln(qt) = ln(a)  (1 + 0= exp(xt)) + q1t
)
(7:1:1)
Switching Equation:
It =
(
1 if y2t =Wt + It 1 + ut = 0
0 otherwise
(7:1:2)
Coding Error Equation:
Dt =
(
1 if y3t = y

2t + t = 0
0 otherwise
)
(7:1:3)
In this specication, the parameter 0 denotes the deterministic part of marginal
cost; ln a and  are demand function parameters (see equation 7.2.3); and  denotes
the e¤ect of the variables Wt on the likelihood of successful collusion in period t.
If a variable xj appears with a positive coe¢cient j , this means that variable xj
has a positive demand impact, ceteris paribus. Similarly, a variable wj which makes
collusion more likely should have a positive  coe¢cient.
Note that there are two errors for the collusive regime, 1 = (1p; 1q)
0, and two
for the punishment regime, 0 = (0p; 0q)
0. We will be neglecting the correlations
between price and quantity errors for a given regime, (rp; rq), r = 1; 0 (i.e., 01 =
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0). Moreover, the correlations of errors across regimes cannot be identied, hence
(0i; 1j) will be set to 0, i; j = p; q. Finally, also for identication, 2 is normalized
to 1.
7.4.2 Estimation Results
The estimation results appear in Tables 13. The basic model 1NL uses the Ulen
(1979) classication of regimes (1 =successful collusion, 0 =price war) and allows
for neither a Markov structure nor measurement errors. Model 2NL also uses Ulens
classication but employs the appropriate methodology of Section 2 to model it as
an imperfect scheme. Note that ML estimation of Model 2NL requires the evaluation
of bivariate normal integrals.
*** TABLES 1, 2, 3 about HERE ***
The main conclusion that can be drawn from Table 1 is that the decision to treat
Ulens classication as perfect or imperfect has a serious impact on the estimates.
The e¤ect is summarized by a strongly signicant variance for the coding error .
Although no coe¢cient estimate switches sign when imperfections in the regime in-
formation are recognized, the predicted regime classications change substantially.
According to the criterion of maximum probability, Model 2NL predicts that 218 out
of 328 periods involved collusion, while Model 1NL predicts that in 233 periods the
JEC cartel was e¤ective. See Table 4 for the predicted counts from each model and
Figure 5 of the Online extended version of this paper for a representation of these
predictions.25
The cost parameter is statistically better determined once imperfections in the
regime indicators are admitted. My two new exogenous variables are very signicant
both on the demand side ( coe¢cients) and in the switching equation (s). Demand
for railroad shipping by the cartel is higher when the lakes are closed, extra-cartel
competition is ine¤ective, and more total grain is available to be shipped. In par-
ticular, the importance of lake tra¢c as a substitute is conrmed as its coe¢cient
is negative and statistically signicant. Moreover, contrary to the Rotemberg and
Saloner (1986) predictions, the variables that have positive demand e¤ects raise the
probability that the cartel is colluding e¤ectively. Recall that in the (7.2.5a) pa-
rameterization of the Rotemberg and Saloner model, each coe¢cient corresponding
to one of the demand variables entered in the switching equation should have the
25A third version was also estimated, model 3NL, which combined two sources of regime classifying
information using the multiple indicator models developed above. The second regime indicator I tried
was the one constructed by Porter (1983b), which employs the predictions from his estimated model.
The results from the two-indicator model were very similar to those from the one-indicator model
2NL and are not reported.
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opposite sign that the coe¢cient of that variable has in the demand function. In
contrast to this, in all specications estimated in this paper every demand variable is
found to have an e¤ect with the same sign when entered as an exogenous variable in
the switching equation. Specically, the probability of collusion rises with the level
of grain available for shipping and falls with e¤ective outside competition and the
lakes being open. In his detailed study of the JEC, Ulen (1983) also believes that
cartel adherence was strongly positively correlated with cyclical demand conditions;
for example, demand upturns appeared to have been enough to extricate the cartel
from its 1884-85 price-warfare phase.26
Table 2 shows that the construction of the exogenous variables is probably not
inducing serious measurement errors. Allowing for normal errors in the extra-cartel
competition index does not a¤ect results substantially, in terms of either the coe¢-
cient estimates or the predicted regime classications.27 An interesting by-product
of Table 2 is a comparative evaluation of simulation-based estimation, in particular
MSL based on the SRC/GHK simulator. The ML results obtained by numerical
quadrature are very close to the MSL estimates when 100 replications were used for
MSL.
Table 3 presents the results of estimating the cartel model with Markov structure
in the switching equation. The ndings in Table 3 lend strong support to the Abreu
et al. (1986) model since the coe¢cient 1 that allows for the rst-order Markov
structure is very strongly signicant. The other parameters are substantially di¤er-
ent from those of the (conditional) Bernoulli model, which suggests that coe¢cient
estimates under the (apparently untenable) assumption of Bernoulli switching should
not be trusted. Moreover, the models with a Markov structure predict that collusion
was e¤ective in fewer periods than suggested by the corresponding models estimated
with 1 and 2 set to 0; this nding is more in line with Ulens regime classication.
28
Longer lag structures were tried, but most of the time dependence does not seem to
extend beyond two weeks. Some evidence against the optimal one-period punishment
26The cross-country analysis of Suslow (1988) using hazard modelling provides independent con-
rmation of the nding that successful collusion is more likely to occur in demand booms.
27An issue that remains unanswered is whether incorporating classical measurement errors in the
explanatory variables through the approach of Section 4 is too restrictive. As already mentioned,
one way to test for this possibility is through nonparametric mixture models. No such attempts are
made in this paper, because of the high data requirements of such estimation approaches.
28 It is possible that the nding of a strongly signicant Markov structure may be caused by residual
serial correlation in the unobservables. Unfortunately, even in linear models it is very di¢cult in
practice to di¤erentiate, through the implied common-factor restrictions, the presence of lagged
dependent variables as regressors from residual serial correlation. Moreover, given the nonlinearity
of the models of this paper, explicit allowance for serial correlation is not feasible with ML methods,
because integration of order T = 328 would be required.
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story can be seen (the asymptotic t-statistic of the coe¢cient of the second lag being
1.82), but a caveat to be borne in mind is that a week may not be the economically
relevant decision-making interval for this cartel.29
It is important to note that other game-theoretic models of oligopolistic behaviour
and tacit collusion relax the key assumption made by both Abreu et al. and by
Rotemberg and Saloner that demand shocks be i:i:d: over time. These models, due
to Riordan (1985) and Haltiwanger and Harrington (1988), allow instead for serially
correlated demand shocks. It would be interesting to test econometrically whether
the two strong ndings of this paper, namely existence of a Markov structure in the
switching behaviour and the greater likelihood of price warfare in recessions than in
booms, would survive such a generalization.
8 Conclusion
This paper discusses switching regressions econometric modelling with imperfect
regime classication information. Its econometric novelty is that misclassication
probabilities are allowed to vary endogenously over time. Standard maximum likeli-
hood estimation is infeasible in this case because each likelihood contribution requires
the evaluation of 2T terms (where T is the number of observations available). We de-
veloped an algorithm that allows e¢cient estimation when such imperfect information
is available, by evaluating the exact likelihood through simply T matrix multiplica-
tions (each of a 2  2 matrix times a 2  1 vector.) Our methods were shown to be
widely applicable to various areas of analysis such as to Markov-Switching models in
Macroeconomics; to external nancing problems faced by rms in Corporate Finance;
and to game-theoretic models of price collusion in Industrial Organization.
We applied our methods to analyze and test two prototypical game-theoretic
models of price xing and tacit collusion. Switching regressions were used to model
the rms shifting between collusive and punishment behaviour. Our ndings cast
doubt on the applicability of the Rotemberg and Saloner model to the JEC railroad
cartel, while they conrmed the Markovian prediction of the Abreu et al. model of
price-xing behaviour.
29The evidence in Ulen (1979) suggests that all price changes occurred on a Monday. But important
time-aggregation issues, of course, remain.
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Data Appendix
Constructed Data Series
More details on the construction of these two series can be found in Roth (1988).
1. Construction of Extra-Cartel Railroad Competition Index
The strength of extra-cartel competition as a threat to the JEC cartel is as-
sumed to be directly related to the number of railroads that were outside the cartel
and shipping grain to the East Coast. MacAvoy (1965) documents the existence of
extra-cartel competing railroads and species the exact periods when the JEC cartel
responded to the existence of such rms in each case. According to this information,
the rst extra-cartel competitor was acknowledged by the JEC in week 210 of the
sample (January 4, 1884); a second extra-cartel railroad appeared as a competitor
on August 15, 1884, which is week 242; nally, a third railroad rm withdrew from
the JEC cartel following an unfavourable ruling by a JEC arbitrator and started
competing with the cartel in February 6, 1885 (week 267). I follow Roth (1988) and
assume that the strength of extra-cartel competition varied with the square-root of
the number of railroads operating outside the cartel.
2. Construction of Total Midwest Grain Production Index
Annual data were collected on the largest grain crops (corn, wheat, and oats)
from eight Midwestern states. The quantities were weighted according to the av-
erage U.S. price for each grain over the period, to generate an annual value index
of midwestern grain output. Considerations of a lag between harvest and shipping
suggested assigning the annual grain production value to January 1 of the following
year. Finally, simple linear interpolation was used to construct weekly values for this
index.
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Figure 1a: Conditional Probabilities
28
Figure 1b: Total Probabilities
29
Figure 1c: Joint Probabilities
30
Figure 2: Punishment/Collusion Phases
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Figure 3: Prices, Lakes, and Collusion
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Figure 4a: Extra cartel competition index
Figure 4b: Midwest Grain Production Index
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TABLE 1
BERNOULLI MODELS, NO MEASUREMENT ERRORS IN REGRESSORS
Regime Classication Variable Used: CAUlen (1 = Collusion)
(Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses)
Variable Parameter Model 1NL1 Model 2NL2
20p 6.13 5.63
(2.59) (2.88)
21p 5.44 4.27
(2.37) (2.25)
20q 0.27 0.32
(2.02) (1.76)
21q 0.17 0.23
(2.01) (2.11)
Coding Error 2  1.63
(3.59)
Marginal Cost Equation: 0 16.63 8.21
(0.29) (2.40)
Demand Equation:
ln(a) 10.96 11.96
(0.13) (0.68)
0 2.78 3.92
(0.11) (2.27)
Lakes open dummy 1 -0.40 -0.91
(-10.72) (-12.81)
Midwestern Grain Output 2 0.86 0.921
(11.12) (9.812)
Extra JEC Competition 3 -0.44 -0.34
(-15.53) (-11.43)
Switching Equation:
0 -0.52 -0.72
(0.32) (-1.95)
Lakes open dummy 1 -0.76 -0.93
(-2.77) (-4.83)
Midwestern Grain Output 2 5.01 3.78
(4.95) (7.23)
Extra JEC Competition 3 -2.40 -3.71
(-5.36) (-7.87)
Loglikelihood -444.414 -437.342
1 No lags, no measurement errors
2 No lags, one imperfect regime indicator
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TABLE 2
BERNOULLI MODELS, ERRORS IN EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
Regime Classication Variable Used: CAUlen (1 = Collusion)
(Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses)
Variable Parameter Model 4NL1;2 Model 5NL1;3
20p 5.23 5.29
(3.66) (3.06)
21p 5.01 4.84
(2.58) (2.63)
20q 0.27 0.44
(2.91) (3.32)
21q 0.21 0.36
(2.72) (2.89)
Marginal Cost Equation: 0 14.63 14.01
( 0.72) ( 0.63)
Demand Equation:
ln(a) 9.23 9.88
(0.27) (0.42)
0 2.97 3.21
(0.28) (0.33)
Lakes open dummy 1 -0.77 -0.88
(-11.25) (-12.38)
Midwestern Grain Output 2 1.27 0.71
(9.21) (8.99)
Extra JEC Competition 3 -0.22 -0.23
(-11.83) (-10.35)
Switching Equation:
0 -0.76 -0.82
(-0.99) ( 1.22)
Lakes open dummy 1 -0.53 -0.59
(-3.67) (-3.17)
Midwestern Grain Output 2 4.83 4.61
(3.67) (4.81)
Extra JEC Competition 3 -1.83 -2.01
(-7.48) (-7.12)
Loglikelihood -456.397 -453.231
1 Normal measurement errors in Extra Cartel Competition variable
2 MSM with 100 replications
3 ML Quadrature
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TABLE 3
MARKOV SWITCHING STRUCTURE,
Regime Classication Variable Used: CAUlen (1 = Collusion)
(Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses)
Variable Parameter Model 6L1 Model 7L2 Model 8L3
20p 6.97 6.78 6.32
(2.18) (2.38) (2.42)
21p 5.43 5.11 4.37
(3.36) (3.46) (2.12)
20q 0.97 0.89 0.78
(3.18) (3.27) (2.95)
21q 0.78 0.81 0.64
(3.72) (3.82) (3.47)
Marginal Cost Equation: 0 12.63 12.52 10.43
(0.96) (0.95) (2.77)
Demand Equation:
ln(a) 7.93 7.83 7.42
(1.23) (1.35) (1.08)
0 4.22 4.17 4.12
(0.74) (0.81) (0.72)
Lakes open dummy 1 -0.23 -0.28 -0.35
(-12.78) (-11.81) (-8.42)
Midwestern Grain Output 2 0.72 0.77 0.81
(7.24) (7.38) (8.15)
Extra JEC Competition 3 -0.33 -0.41 -0.32
(-12.35) (-11.92) (-9.93)
Switching Equation:
0 -0.50 -0.51 -0.47
(0.78) (0.82) (0.58)
Lakes open dummy 1 -0.66 -0.75 -0.49
(-3.23) (-3.27) (-3.59)
Midwestern Grain Output 2 3.37 3.42 3.75
(2.88) (2.94) (2.73)
Extra JEC Competition 3 -2.93 -2.74 -3.02
(-6.72) (-6.84) (-6.32)
Regime Lagged Once 1 0.78 0.56 0.58
(6.23) (5.72) (6.52)
Regime Lagged Twice 2  0.25 
(1.82)
Loglikelihood -423.773 -422.661 -418.524
1 No errors, Markov structure with one lag
2 No errors, Markov structure with two lags
3 One imperfect dummy, Markov structure with one lag
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TABLE 4
Regime Classications:
Indicator Variables and Model Predictions
Number of Periods Number of Periods
in Collusive Regime in Competitive Regime
Ulen Indicator 203 125
Porter Indicator 238 90
Model 1NL 233 95
Model 2NL 218 110
Model 4NL 231 97
Model 5NL 230 98
Model 6L 208 120
Model 7L 206 122
Model 8L 204 124
Note: All model predictions are according to the criterion of maximum proba-
bility dened above.
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